Marcos’ Foreign Policy Shifts: Philippines in the US China Rivalry

The Philippines elections in May 2022 saw the political fortunes of the Marcos family revived with the victory President Bong Bong Marcos. On assuming the Presidential office, the Philippines has been at the centre of a flurry of diplomatic activities even as the country is now emerging as a critical focus for the attentions of both China and the United States, as growing rivalry between the two countries continues to impact the regional states in Southeast Asia.

In the first week of July, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi was on a tour of regional states in Southeast Asia, which is being viewed by several regional observers as a counter to the growing influence of the United States to leverage the ASEAN states, in an effort to diplomatically engage the region more proactively. Wang Yi’s visit, one of many to the ASEAN region, focuses on countering United States’ efforts to promote a regional order that is not driven from a Chinese perspective and where the regional states relook at engaging more robustly with the United States and its alliance partners. During the current visit to five states, the Philippines interaction has been the most critical, even as this diplomatic outreach to the new political dispensation indicates the importance that China attaches to ensuring that the current administration looks at the benefits of its ties with China.

China seeks to continue the leverage it is able to advance with the Duterte government. The former administration under Duterte broke the earlier leaning towards the United States, which marked a tradition in Philippines foreign policy, to establish closer links with China based on two factors. First, this shift was driven by internal political factors, which impacted the United States-Philippines bilateral relations on vital political issues. Under the Obama administration the emphasis on the human rights record of President Duterte came to the forefront, especially concerning the manner in which he had handled the war on drugs within the country. US criticism on the extra judicial killings to deal with the issue of curbing the drug menace within the country led to political rhetoric between the two countries. Second factor that propelled the Philippines into closer ties with China took place in the aftermath of the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in July 2016. Chinese disregard for the PCA verdict and insistence that the ruling was to be considered `null and void’, allowed for little progress on the maritime dispute. Moreover, China carried out punitive economic measures against the Philippines in bilateral trade relations, sending clear signals that economic ties would be hampered in the face of the maritime issues. With disregard to the UNCLOS and the PCA ruling, China has systematically continued its violations of the maritime boundaries with Philippines and other ASEAN states showing scant regard for the relevance of international law.

The Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) which was the cornerstone of the US Philippines security ties continued to evolve under the Duterte administration even as it incorporated both economic and defence dimensions. On the 60th anniversary of the agreement in 2011, the partnership evolved under the rubric of `Partnership for Growth’ broadening the scope of the relationship. Under the Duterte administration this evolved further as it was rechristened as the `Partnership for Growth with Equity’, which actually fitted into Duterte’s Philippines Development Plan launched from 2017-2022. The US Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement which has been in place since 1999 has seen ups and downs during the Duterte period. In February 2020, President Duterte stated that the agreement would be terminated and even suggested a payment in lieu of keeping the agreement alive, later retracting his statement and lifted the order for its cancellation in July 2020.

Similarly as part of the Philippines Development Plan Duterte also increased economic interaction with China and opened the domestic economy to large Chinese infrastructure investment aid following his state visit to China in October 2016, wherein China pledged financial support to the tune of US $ 24 billion under what was known as the `build build build’ programme. However, these promises for investments fell short of the actual pledges, leading to critical assessment of the bilateral ties, since it was interpreted as Chinese efforts to shortchange the Philippines, even as the increasing security challenges to the maritime disputes in the South China Sea continued to have bilateral implications. In August 2021 the issue of the China Philippines partnership was reiterated during the virtual summit meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Duterte, even as two years of the pandemic has led to a shift in the aid which the Philippines received, as it was focused on addressing the COVID situation in the country.

As the new administration came into office, the visit of Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi comes in the aftermath of certain calculated steps taken by President Marcos. President Marcos’ appointment of the Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs is critically highlighting the likely agenda that he would pursue. While the Defence Department and Department of Foreign Affairs are now headed by a retired army general, Jose Faustino Jr. and retired diplomat Enrique Manalo respectively, the choices indicate a return to the older approach to Philippines politics which had special relations with the United States and may use strategic balancing as a key option to maintain the country’s autonomy in a region of great power rivalry. Moreover, President Marcos’ tougher position on the maritime disputes and the more recent remarks on the need to re-negotiate US $ 4.9 billion railway project funded by Chinese investments, signals an incremental shift in the ongoing diplomatic tussle in which the Philippines finds itself. As a smaller nation caught in the throes of the regional power games, the Marcos administration promises to be interesting for Southeast Asia watchers.

Professor Shankari Sundararaman is Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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