Dr. Devender Kumar
Germany recently passed a bill to reinstate military service that had been disbanded in 2011 during Chancellor Angela Merkel’s tenure. It has been now restored due to heightened Russian military threat since the Russia-Ukraine war. As the Trump administration withdrew its funding from Europe’s defence, Germany and other European nations have stepped up to work towards expanding respective military capabilities, a move that is likely to reshape Europe's defence positions, NATO’s eastern flank, and signal a shift toward greater European military self-reliance due to Russia’s unwillingness to end the war.
Countries such as Lithuania (2015), Sweden (2017), Latvia (2023), Serbia (2024), United Kingdom (2024) too have reinstated compulsory military service and raised questions on European security architecture, but are now preparing the next generation for warfare after the Russian-Ukraine war as most of these countries had abolished compulsory military service in 2011. Moscow’s annexation of Crimea (2014) and full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have pushed Western leaders to sharpen their military strategies.
The German Defence Minister had earlier argued that “Vladimir Putin might attack a NATO country one day”. Germany and most European countries have realised that their armed forces are ill-equipped to counter Russia, hence are preparing for the possibility of being tasked to ensure the security of Ukraine—as the US Vice President had earlier warned Europe during the Munich Security Conference this year and stated that “If you want peace, prepare for war, but Europe seems to be, if you want peace, call someone else”.
Since then, European states have enhanced their defence spending as highlighted by the Goldman Sachs' report 2025, Europe increased its real defence spending between 2014 and 2025 by an average of 3.9% each year, while European defence stocks repeatedly reached record highs in 2025. At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, Allies committed to investing 5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually in core defence requirements and security-related spending by 2035.
The problems of Europe are embedded in the projection of Europe as one that is internally fragmented and politically divided on many issues. Nevertheless, there are five key strategic reasons for the resurgence of conscription in Europe's security architecture.
First, Russia presents the most immediate security threat to Europe. Many of the continent’s security and defence industry challenges predate the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Europe faces structural issues such as the ongoing industrial decline, insufficient investment, political fragmentation, overregulation, and economic divisions, which have rendered its defence sector too sluggish, diminutive, and disjointed to efficiently address its security necessities.
Second, decades of underinvestment have sadly weakened Europe’s defence manufacturing, leading to significant capability gaps. If all EU countries had consistently met the NATO target of 2% of their GDP for defence from 2006 to 2020, Europe could have invested around €1.1 trillion more, an amount that surpasses the US’s yearly defence budget. Unfortunately, ongoing underfunding has resulted in notable gaps in defence capabilities.
Third, due to rising external security concerns, especially from Moscow, Europe is recognizing its mistake of not having developed a strong defence manufacturing unit while having a fragmented industrial base, supplemented with internal challenges, which are prompting the EU to change its approach. It has adopted Security and Action for Europe (SAFE) in 2025 to support member countries to enhance their defence preparedness by investing in the European defence sector to address the major capacity gaps in the region and reduce dependence on non-EU suppliers.
Fourth, the structure of European security, established after the Second World War via mechanisms, i.e., EU Defence Policy, the ‘Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’ (OSCE), and national strategies, has failed in providing security and creating influence for European states in the global security nexus. Therefore, Europe is considering a relook at its cooperative coexistence approach and asserting itself as a dominant geopolitical actor not only on the continent but also for its partners. This change is vital for the evolving international power dynamics, marked by the rising competition between the US and China, thereby challenging the traditional role of Europe in global security.
Fifth, the absence of proper security architecture and over-dependence on NATO and the US is making the EU and many European countries face an existential threat of becoming irrelevant both collectively and individually in the backdrop of Russian assertiveness of its stakes in Europe. To counter such threats, reinstating conscription would not solve the problem.
Europe risks becoming side-lined in a world increasingly shaped by great power rivalries; hence, by redefining its strategic priorities and increasing its collective defence and diplomatic competencies, it can secure its security interests and create influence rather than depending on the US and NATO for security.
Europe must increase its GDP contribution to defence, strengthen its capability in sectors such as cyber, space, and nuclear, and keep pace with the technological advancements worldwide to reinforce European defence industrial manufacturing.
Dr. Devender Kumar is Assistant Professor at the Center of Excellence for Geopolitics and International Studies (CEGIS), REVA University.