The contemporary strategic discourse is centered on the Persian Gulf pivoting on the US-Israel attacks on Iran. It is focused on multidimensional warfare, damage-destruction-shutting of critical energy infrastructure, and soaring energy prices. The Iranian threat to close the Straits of Hormuz has further added to the energy conundrum.

The purported message by Mojtaba Khamenei, the new supreme leader of Iran, notes “The lever of blocking the Strait of Hormuz must undoubtedly continue to be used” has added ‘fuel to fire’ prompting Persian Gulf oil and gas producing littoral states to explore alternate routes (over land) through pipelines reaching either the Gulf of Oman-Arabian Sea (Port of Khorfakkan and Port of Fujairah) or the Red Sea in the west (1,200 kilometers East–West Crude Oil Pipeline) and thus bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Though feasible and currently operational, the Yanbu dual pipeline (5 million barrels per day capacity) and trucking offer very limited solution but attract attendant challenges such as cost of transportation, volumes and the time required.

The ongoing Hormuz crisis has also triggered new ideas such as a canal connecting the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. It is being touted “as a long-term strategic and economic project to reduce dependence” on the Strait. However, it merits attention that it “requires enormous investment complex engineering across desert terrain, and major political coordination” between Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates Qatar. Above all, by current estimates it could cost nearly $30 billion. Though in its infancy, the idea has the potential to offer some solution to the constant fear of Iranian threat of closure of the Strait, albeit this infrastructure remains an attractive target for Iran which can exploit the vulnerability of the route by using military means.

Elsewhere, an idea to build a canal to bypass the Straits of Malacca has been under discussion for several decades. The plans to build a navigable passage i.e. Kra Isthmus, are announced time to time and these also emerge as agenda for strategic debates and discussions whenever crisis hit Straits of Malacca. The long dormant project, now christened as “Land Bridge Project” (LBP), was reported to be “open for biding in December 2025” and “construction expected to begin in 2026” has not yet begun. The Phase 1 of the project is “valued at 520 billion baht, [and] scheduled to be operational by 2030”. The LBP (95 kilometers long and 26-metre-deep) through Thailand involves investment of around 1 trillion baht and thereby link the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Thailand. The LBP will potentially shorten sailing time by two days and cut at least 1,000 kilometers of motoring by ships. Europe-Middle East-Northeast Asia traffic particularly for smaller vessels, will be able to route through the Canal and bypass the Straits of Malacca during any crisis.

In 2016, the Thai-Chinese Cultural and Economic Association constituted National Committee for the Study of the Kra Canal Project to undertake a feasibility study; but the project attracted numerous challenges including political turmoil in South Thailand, controversy over environment issues and the unlikely economic benefits.

However, China is keen to develop the canal project and sees it through the prism of the “Malacca Dilemma’ which has figured prominently in Chinese sea lane security dynamics. It also fits well into the Chinese “Maritime Silk Road” initiatives that envisages building maritime infrastructure in the Indian Ocean to support both commercial interests and naval strategy.

The Chinese economic needs and the imbedded strategic intent to develop the LBP offers both challenges and opportunities for the countries in the Bay of Bengal. In this context, for India the International Container Transhipment Terminal (ICTT) under the Great Nicobar Project is being developed as a container transshipment hub could serve as the western gateway for LBP; but it will have to compete with the existing container shipping hubs such as Colombo, Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Yangon in Myanmar and Kolkata in India. However, shipping services through the latter three ports are not highly profitable due to constraint of geography i.e. being riverine ports.

The strategic dimension of the LBP is worrisome for India given that there has been near continuous Chinese naval presence in the Bay of Bengal-Indian Ocean region. Besides Chinese “dual-purpose civilian ships that are suspected of performing military roles” have resulted in mounting apprehension among the naval planners. According to Indian Naval chief, “We are aware that some of the vessels from China have dual purposes. They are not doing what they have declared. We are watching them and monitoring their activities. In many cases, we have called out these ships and told them that this is not allowed here.”

In the context of current Straits of Hormuz crisis where alternate routes are being explored along with energy infrastructure such as pipelines and seaport, LBP is a useful option but it will also be a major strategic-security challenge for India.

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is former Director National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi and is associated with Kalinga International Foundation, New Delhi.